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This essay is written as a drama that opens with Aristotle, St. Augustine of Hippo, St.
Thomas Aquinas, and Nicholas ofCusa debating the nature and reality of infinity, introducing
historical concepts such as potential, actual, and divine infinity. Georg Cantor,founder ofset
theory, then gives a lecture on set theory and transfinite numbers. The lecture concludes with
a discussion of the theological motivations and implications of set theory and Cantor's abso-
lute infinity. The parado.xes inherent in analyzing absolute infinity seem to provide a useful
analogy for understanding God's unknowable nature and the divine relation to creation.
Introduction
This essay is an introduction to the phi-
losophy, theology, and mathematics of the
infinite, written as an imaginary conversation
among the following figures:
• Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.): a classical Greek
philosopher whose ideas on philosophy, sci-
ence, ethics, and politics defined pre-Enlight-
enment Western thought and remain enor-
mously influential today.
• Augustine of Hippo (354-403 c.t;.): a North
African whose Neo-Platonic writings repre-
sent the first major philosophical treatment
of Christian thought and laid the intellectual
foundations of Western Christian theology.
• Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274 r.E.): an Ital-
ian Dominican who sought to integrate Aris-
totelian and Christian thought. His sytematic
approach to theology defines the Scholastic
tradition and remains especially influential in
the Roman Catholic tradition.
• Nicholas ofCusal 1401-1464 C.E.): a Ger-
man cardinal who wrote on a wide variety of
subjects, especially mysticism, mathematics,
and the infinite. He is best known for his be-
lief that human knowledge is necessarily in-
complete.
After these figues rehearse the develop-
ment of premodern thought on the infinite.
Georg Cantor ( 1 845- 1918 c.e.), the Russian-
born mathematician whose set theory revolu-
tionized thinking about infinity and launched
the first successful attempt at a theoretical
justification for mathematics, gives a lecture
on modem mathematics of the infinite. Fi-
nally, everyone responds to Cantor's ideas,
briefly developing set theory's theological
importance for the conception of divine in-
finity.
The primary aim of this essay is not to
develop a comprehensive theology of the in-
finite, but to make available the detailed back-
ground in theology and mathematics neces-
sary for such a study and to suggest areas of
application that may prove fruitful for further
research. Though the speakers use contem-
porary language and a casual tone, each
character's remarks represent their actual
thoughts; detailed references direct readers to
sources for more extensive treatment. If this
essay provokes a fuller examination of set
theory and theology, it will have been suc-
cessful.
Setting
A small room with a table and a few chairs.
Paper tablets and pencils are stacked neatly
on the table. There is a window on one side
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of the room. The end wall is covered by a
chalkboard.
[Four men enter through the main doorJ
Nicholas of Cusa:
I thought I'd never find this place—glad I
bumped into the rest of you.
Aristotle:
I still don't see the point of this. This lec-
turer can't have anything new to say about
infinity. It's just an idea, and an unrealizable
one at that.'
Augustine, Bishop of Hippo:
What about God?
Aristotle:
What's infinity got to do with the gods?
It's a quantitative notion derived from the
physical world. Imagine some large quantity
or magnitude. Can't you always enlarge it by
adding to the initial amount? No matter how
much you add, it's always possible to add
more. The infinite can never be actualized.'
Thomas Aquinas:
You certainly seem to have shown that
infinite quantity and magnitude don't exist,
but what's that to do with God, who has nei-
ther quantity nor magnitude? ' Didn't you say
in Physics that some non-physical entities
—
like time and motion—are actually infinite?"*
(whom you call God) and in the present by
"now." That which is bounded is not infi-
nite.'
Augustine:
Stop! You began by talking about unat-
tainable quantities and magnitudes; now
you're referring to anything unlimited. Your
first notion of infinity applies only to amounts;
let's call that quantitative infinity. Your sec-
ond notion of infinity—that which is without
limit—includes and goes beyond quantitative
infinity. Let's call that divine infinity since
it's related to God.*"
Nicholas:
Definitions won't get us very far. If the
infinite is without limit, how can we limited
humans grasp it? And if definitions are limit-
ing, how can they help us to contemplate the
divine? ^
Aristotle:
And why use the word infinity in both
definitions? Infinity has to do with measure-
ment, and you cannot measure the divine.
Aquinas:
But you just equated limitlessness and
infinity, and limitlessness is inherent in God's
being, which is not something countable like
a bundle of sticks.**
God provides signs and tools analogous to
divine characteristics that help us under-
stand. Mathematical infinity is analogous
to divine infinityy so we can use theformer
to glimpse at the nature of the latter.
[Augustine]
Aristotle:
You don't quite understand /*/;v5/r5, do
you? Motion and time have always existed,
but only because there is no concept of he-
fore without the existence of time. Time
is eternal, but it isn't infinite: Time is
bounded in the past by the prime mover
Aristotle:
You can't speak of
infinity as if it were an
intrinsic property of
some objects!^
Nicholas:
But God isn't an ob-
ject. God is infinite
—
but much more so than
a bottomless pit or an
I endless sequence. He is
the Absolute Maximum and the Absolute In-
finite. All other notions of infinity are infe-
rior to God's perfect infinity.'"
[Aquinas and Aristotle look puzzled, j
Augustine:
Maybe Nicholas means that divine and
quantitative infinhy aren't unrelated, so us-
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ing infinity in both definitions makes sense.
God is beyond notions of quantitative infin-
ity, but quantitative infinity may be an imper-
fect shadow of divine infinity."
Aristotle:
Don't get Platonic on me. Nicholas just
said God is perfect, but if God is perfect then
God is not infinite: Infinity implies imper-
fection and indefiniteness. Perfect objects are
complete and harmonious, like perfect geo-
metric figures.'-
Aquinas:
I think you're confusing the two infini-
ties again. Unlike all other items, God's in-
finity is essential to His being, so God is both
divinely infinite and perfect. He is beyond
the form and matter implied by mere quanti-
tative, imperfect infinity.'^
Augustine:
Right. Divine infinity just seems indefi-
nite because you can only understand it in
terms of quantitative infinity.
Nicholas:
Yes, but humans can never know divine
infinity. Consider a line. We can't con-
ceive of a perfect line, because it doesn't
exist in nature for us to observe. We can
approach perfection through geometry, but
even that doesn't work in the end. When
we try to imagine infinite lines, all we re-
ally get are imperfect portions and finite
imitations.'^
[Aquinas stifles a snigger.]
Aristotle:
You Christians—hindsight is easy! I
know we can't imagine actual infinite quan-
tities—they don't exist! Infinity, however, is
real in this sense: Imagine a yardstick. Take
away half of it and you have 18 inches. Take
away half again and you have 9, then 4 '/2,
then 2 'A, and so on. You can proceed in this
manner forever and some of the original yard-
stick will always remain. Thus the yardstick,
and by extension all magnitudes, are infinite
by division.'''
Nicholas:
But you'll never accomplish an infinite
number of divisions. It would take forever,
and you yourself argued that time isn't infi-
nite.
Aristotle:
Correct, so I say the yardstick is poten-
tially infinite rather than actually infinite,
since to actually produce infinitely many di-
visions would require an infinite length of
time and an infinitely fine cutting tool. The
idea of infinity is inherent in the process of
dividing. The reason people are fooled into
believing that infinitely large magnitudes ac-
tually exist is that the process of adding to a
pile or lengthening a line seems to point to
such potential infinities in nature.""
Augustine:
So the notion of infinity is clear enough.
Nicholas:
What arrogance! No one can understand
infinity—even potential infinity—except
God. You think you can see the infinite, but
God is beyond anything that's obsei"vable. To
use Aristotle's tenns, God is both ultimate
potentiality and ultimate actuality. He is ac-
tualized possibility and possible actuality,
beyond both potential and actual infinities.'^
Augustine:
Divine qualities are difficult but not im-
possible to grasp for the faithful. God pro-
vides signs and tools analogous to divine char-
acteristics that help us understand. Math-
ematical infinity is analogous to divine infin-
ity, so we can use the former to glimpse at the
nature of the latter. Similarly, Man was cre-
ated in God's image, so our minds are the best
tools for understanding the mind of God. '^
Nicholas:
No. When we say, "God is infinite" or
"God is perfect," we categorize God accord-
ing to human ideas of perfection or infinity.
God is more perfect than we can possibly
imagine, so ascribing to Him worldly traits
paints a limited picture of God. Similarly, God
is more infinite than we can conceive—Oh,
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this quantitative language is useless! God is
the Absolute Maximum—words don't really
apply to Him.''^
Augustine:
But if we have faith, God can reveal spiri-
tual nature through physical analogs. Didn't
you say mathematics is the most perfect tool
we have? The possibility of infinite numbers
can tell us something about God's unlimited
nature if we allow the divine words to speak
within us.-"
Nicholas:
I agree that analogy is the only construc-
tive way to talk about God and that mathemat-
ics is probably the best analogy to use for the
divine. Still, God has created a spatially infi-
nite universe for us to ponder, but that spatial
infinity is not like divine infinity.-'
We cannot know whether the ideas in our
limited minds accurately describe Gody
even in some limited way. Language
doesn^t help at all; itJust tempts us into
thinking we know more about God than
we actually do.
Aristotle:
We've already been over the fact that spa-
tial infinity does not and cannot exist! It's
paradoxical to suggest that even a divinely
infinite god can create the impossible.^^
Augustine:
It only seems like a paradox because,
though man was created in God's image, we
cannot understand His nature without help.
If God were to reveal the true nature of infin-
ity and His being, we'd be able to resolve the
paradox."
Aristotle:
I don't know about the need for divine
revelation, but 1 do agree that most difficul-
ties can be avoided if crucial concepts are
properly understood. Zeno's paradoxes gave
my contemporaries fits until I demonstrated
that they vanished with proper understanding
of potential infinities. Apparent contradictions
must always yield to reason in the end, even
the contradictions we've discussed regarding
divine infinity.-^
Nicholas:
You're both mistaken about paradox.
Mere words will alwiiys fail to describe God.
Paradoxes are not only inevitable, they are
necessary if we hope to know what we can-
not say about God.'^
Aquinas:
I agree that we cannot fully know God.
We can make statements about God, how-
ever—like "God is good"—but we know
those words are wholly inadequate to describe
God's actual divine goodness.-*'
Nicholas:
I wouldn't even go
that far. We cannot
know whether the ideas
in our limited minds
accurately describe
God, even in some lim-
Av ited way. Language
'^ doesn't help at all; it
I just tempts us into
i thinking we know
* more about God than
we actually do. Only "negations are true and
affirmations are inadequate." ^^
Aquinas:
But if language is inadequate, negations
about God cannot be any more accurate than
assertions about God!
Nicholas:
No. If I say "God is not weak," I'm not
implying "God is strong." Negations are cor-
rect because they refrain from describing
God. The more we seek to use words about
God, the more words fail us. Paradoxes like
"God is infinite and perfect" or "Jesus was
God and man" are not results of poor defini-
tions. They highlight language's imperfec-
tion and force us to abandon words when
contemplating God. We must embrace our
ignorance of God and move beyond words.
[Nicholas]
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beyond sensory perception. The only true
way to know God is through the mystical ex-
perience, and even then we just see more
clearly that we do not know God. Sill, this
ignorance makes us wiser because we un-
derstand that we do not and cannot know
God.^«
Aquinas:
I'm still not convinced that a paradox ex-
ists. Language may be inadequate, but God
can't be both finite and infinite, for example.
Augustine:
I agree with Thomas. A language para-
dox doesn't necessarily prevent us from un-
derstanding divine infinity. Nicholas says we
can't know God, but we were created in God's
image. Only sin prevents us from fully know-
ing God.-''
Aristotle:
Pious rubbish! You don't need divine help
to understand divine infinity. Just read Phys-
ics and Metaphysics. I cannot understand a
prime mover's existing beyond magnitude and
time, but only because I wasn't around when
the world was created. We humans have no
experience with things outside of place and
time.'"
Augustine:
But God can lead us to understanding.
Nicholas:
[Impatiently] No! We can't even figure
out regular infinity! Are you listening to me?
Look, divide an infinite line in half and each
half must still be infinite. '' Don't try to tell
me you understand that. The diagonal of a
square is incommensurable with its sides.''
We can see the diagonal as plain as day on
paper, but no fraction can accurately describe
it. Infinity is like that. It's deceptively simple,
and we seem to understand it through anal-
ogy, but some power greater than reason and
mathematics, greater than our created intel-
lect, is necessary to truly comprehend it.''
Aquinas:
I don't know about that. I'm sure I can
understand potential infinity.
Augustine:
At the very least, the notion of reaching
infinity by counting is clear. We never get to
the top of Jacob's ladder.
[Nicholas stares at his companions incredu-
lously.]
Nicholas:
Didn't you hear what I just said? Did I
slip into French by accident?
Aristotle:
No need to get so upset, Nicholas. Still,
maybe infinity isn't as simple as I thought.
This lecturer might be useful after all.'^
Aquinas:
We're about to find out; here he comes.
[A slightly disheveled man rushes into the
room.]
Georg Cantor:
[Winded] Sorry I'm late, but my last talk
lasted longer than I expected. Our time is
short, so if you don't mind I'll give my pre-
sentation straight away. Afterwards we can
discuss any questions.
[The class take up their tablets. Cantor un-
folds some papers from his pocket, walks to
the blackboard, and picks up some chalk.]
Cantor:
Mathematicians, philosophers, and theo-
logians have struggled to understand infinity
for thousands of years. The concept of infin-
ity was central to the worldview of the earli-
est Greek thinkers,''' but Aristotle pushed it to
one side, claiming
—
Aristotle:
[Interrupting] There is no need to be of-
fensive.
[Cantor looks up from the blackboard. He
suddenly recognizes his students.]
Cantor:
Oh my! You four are much more sophis-
ticated than most classes. I think I'll skip my
introduction and get straight to the new stuff.
Aristotle was right to say that infinity cannot
be reached by counting things or adding to
them. To understand infinity, we have to aban-
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don the rules of finite arithmetic. Let me use
an analogy.^''
[Augustine grins: Nicholas groans.]
Cantor:
Hebrew and Greek are both languages,
but you can't speak good Greek using He-
brew grammar. Similarly, you can't speak
clearly about infinity using the grammar of
finite arithmetic. Proper non-finite arithmetic
starts with ordinal numbers. Ordinal num-
bers designate places within a sequence. Fi-
nite numbers like 2, 5, 11 all have corre-
sponding ordinals: secomd, iflftli, eleveeth
(I'll use this color to identify ordinals); like-
wise, n denotes the nth position in a well-
ordered sequence. Every ordinal has a
successor, n*. In finite arithmetic, lu* is
equivalent to -- 1 . ^^ You can use ordinals
to describe any group of objects that can be
lined up in a row, and any such group taken
as a whole is called a set. The mathematics
of sets is called set theory. Is everyone with
me so far? ^'^
Augustine:
I think so. The ordinal 2'() describes a con-
tainer with twenty places. When you put
twenty objects into it they compose a set with
20 members.
Cantor:
Exactly. Now, for finite sets the number
of positions in the set equals the number of
objects in that set.^'^
Aquinas:
[Inipatientlyl How obvious can you get?
Cantor:
Just hold on. I want you to imagine the
natural numbers^"—all of them. I use the sym-
bol © to indicate the number of places in the
set of natural numbers.^' You can think about
CO) as follows: For every sequence of finite
ordinals iTii^, n^, iilg,..., there are ordinal num-
bers a such that lii^ < a, for all k.^- I call num-
bers like t transfinite. m is the ""smallest" of
these. It encompasses all the finite ordinals
but cannot be reached by counting.
Aristotle:
But you just said m corresponds to an un-
attainable quantity! How can it exist?
Cantor:
Hold your horses! Remember the anal-
ogy to Greek and Hebrew? 2, S, 1 1, and CiS
are all ordinals, but you need transfinite arith-
metic to talk about m and finite arithmetic to
talk about 2, 5, and 1 1. Like most languages,
finite and transfinite grammars have some
similarities: They both include the succes-
sion rule. Thus m has a successor m<*, repre-
sented by (jy @ 1 ,'^^ and we can continue build-
ing successors (like m @ 2, m @ 3) until we
reach® ® m.
[Aristotle begins to interrupt, but Cantor,
stops him.]
Cantor:
I know. I just said that finite and transfinite
numbers follow different rules, and then I
seemed to use ordinary addition on transfinite
numbers; but transtlnite arithmetic really is quite
different. For example, 2-1-1 = 1+2, but
lij) @ 1 ?t 1 ® (00). Remember, sets are contain-
ers where each object occupies a unique posi-
tion. Consider the set containing all natural
numbers and a bicycle. How long is the row?
For transfinite ordinals, it de^iends on how you
anange the objects. Let's put the bicycle in first:
Positions in the set:
1, 2, 3, 4, ... ®
Objects in the set:
Lib, 1, 2, 3, ... oo
Since the natural numbers are infinite, you can
put infinitely many objects into an w-sized
set as long as these objects occupy distinct
numbered positions. So l ® w = OC) in trans-
finite addition. But watch what happens if
we save the bicycle for last:
Positions in the set:
1, 2, 3, 4, ... m, (Ofl)©l
Objects in the set:
1, 2, 3, 4, ... oo, c^
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You can fit all the natural numbers into Cn" po-
sitions, but there's no room left for the bicycle.
We need a set with w ® 11 places to hold ev-
erything. Thus i ® i is longer than « , since it
denotes an ordering requiring more than w
places. Transfinite multiplication behaves
analogously:
2®m= 2 ® 2 @ 2 ® 2 ® . . . = w,
whereas © ® 2 = m @ m>.
ing some kind of turbo-charged transfinite
counting. We can go farther if we invent new
notation. Suppose r represents the exponen-
tial tower of s that's units high. I can then
continue creating larger ordinals (starting with
M © 1 ) until I reach a tower of ffls that's M
units high. I can always invent new notation
for longer and longer rows, but I'll still never
reach actual infinity—it is potential after all.^^
Ijust said thatfinite and transfinite
numbersfollow different rulesy and
then I seemed to use ordinary addition
on transfinite numbers; but transfinite
arithmetic really is quite different.
[Cantor]
Aquinas:
It's contrary t^i reason!
Nicholas:
Counter-intuitive, perhaps
—
Cantor:
Of course "iyi ® 2 is just the beginning.
If we continue using the principles of ordi-
nal generation, we quickly reach sets that ex-
haust normal mathematical notation. Con-
sider the following sequence of transfinite
ordinals:
Cantor:
Aristotle is on the right
track, but ordinal numbers
are not really counting num-
bers. The set containing a
bicycle and the natural num-
bers can be ordered so as to
contain ¥ or w ® 1
places—but it still contains
the same number of objects.
In order to get a grip on the
size of a set, we have to
learn to count with transfi-
nite cardinal numbers.^^ Consider these se-
quences:
12 3 4 5
4 6 8 10
6
12
1 ...
14...
n..
Zn...
. © ® 2, ... iftji ® 3, ... ffi
0)^® iQO), ... m?® 2, ... m^,
.
There's no end in sight. We can create i)" by
multiplying together infinitely many j; s. It
describes an incredibly long row, but we can
multiply iaji'" by C©"' to get an even longer one.
If we keep going we'll reach a stack of expo-
nential ji s that's w symbols high, a barely
conceivable number.
Aristotle:
[Smugly] Yes, but you still won't have
reached actual infinity. You're just perfomi-
Reason suggests that there are twice as
many natural numbers as even numbers, but
we can exactly pair every natural number
with an even number. The sets are the same
size!
Aquinas:
Another paradox!"^
Cantor:
Not really. Two sets have the same cardi-
nality if every object in one set can be uniquely
matched to an object in the other. In finite
sets ordinals and ciirdinals are trivially equiva-
lent, but for transfinite numbers the difference
is crucial. We can count up to Aristotle's m~
and beyond, but in fact every transfinite num-
ber we've seen so far has the same cardinal-
ity as (Qc itself.
Augustine:
Can you give an example?
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Cantor:
Imagine a library with infinitely many
shelves. We can fit an infinite number of
books into the library and still have room for
two more. We just put these additional books
at the beginning of the first shelf and move
every other book down two places:
Shelf position:
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ... (Oil)
Book number:
00+ 1, oo + 2, 0, 1, 2, ... oo
Aquinas:
So you can fit oo + 2 books into a spaces.
Just like we did with the bicycle!
Cantor:
Right. Order doesn't matter for cardi-
nals. You can rearrange objects however
you like to create a one-to-one correspon-
dence—only essential size matters. Deter-
mining the cardinality of the ordinals we have
seen so far does get more complicated, but
with patience we can show that they all have
the same cardinality as m.'*''
Augustine:
I like your proof, but how do we reach
larger cardinal numbers?
Cantor:
Well, i<,,,^** the first transfinite cardinal,
represents the cardinality of and all succes-
sive countable ordinals.^" We eventually sur-
pass all countable ordinals and reach i^^ , the
first uncountable transfinite cardinal. It rep-
resents the first set whose contents cannot be
placed into a one-to-one correspondence with
the natural numbers. It is uncountably infi-
nite.^° You might think that even though you
can get to i<
^
, the sets with cardinality i<,, are
sufficient to tackle any mathematical problem.
In fact, higher cardinalities are central to one
of the most exciting problems in mathemat-
ics—the nature of the real number line.^' In
1 874 1 completed a controversial proi^f show-
ing that the number of points on a continuous
line is uncountable. Although I didn't use
modern temiinology, I proved that the cardi-
nality of the real number line is greater than
K,, . Later I worked out how to produce sets
of greater cardinality from any given set.**-
This involves power sets, where the power
set of S (iPS), is the set containing all subsets
of S. The cardinality of i:P S is 2^ ." Now,
consider >'/^N, where N represents all the natu-
ral numbers
—
Aquinas:
Wait. We've seen enough to know that
analogies between the finite and transfinite
are problematic.
Cantor:
You're right, but this analogy is an instruc-
tive one: .'>^S = 2^ holds whether S is a finite
or transfinite set. Thus you can go beyiind
i^p by taking i/^N, which I proved represents
the cardinality of the continuum. So the real
number line has cardinality 2**", which is
greater thani^,,.''^
Nicholas:
Amazing! Does the cardinality of the con-
tinuum, ^PH, equal i^,?
[Cantor sighs forlornly.]
Cantor:
You've hit on the million-dollar question.
I have always believed ,'/'N = i^, . Because
the continuum has ciirdinality 2**",^^ I knew
that if I could show i^^ = 2^", or more gener-
ally i^^
I
= 2**", I could elegantly link all the
transfinite cardinals with real numbers and
power sets generated from the natural num-
bers. K, = 2**" is called the Continuum Hy-
pothesis. Set theory developed largely
through my exploration of the real numbers
and desire to prove the Continuum Hypoth-
esis. Unfortunately, I was never able to prove
it, and after my death mathematicians showed
that the Continuum Hypothesis can be nei-
ther proved nor disproved using the assump-
tions of standard set theory.'^''
Nicholas:
1 like this. Logic has proven that truth
lies beyond logic!
Aquinas:
Well, at least now we can explain
Aristotle's infinite divisibility and Zeno's
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paradox. Both cases are attempts to analyze
a continuous line in countable terms. If you
didn't know that the set of real numbers is
essentially larger than the set of natural num-
bers, it'd be easy to get confused.
Ari.stotle:
Yes, I guess that does make sense. Every
transfinite cardinal applies to an infinite num-
ber of transfinite ordinals, but there's still no
foreseeable end to the ladder of infinities
you've created. Though transfinite cardinals
beyond i^, can't be reached by counting,
surely you can go beyond i<
^
and reach cardi-
nals such asi^,,i<^.
When will it all end?
i^ , i^ , and so on.
(0 (1)+
1
Cantor:
Never, if you keep trying to count your
way through the transfinite. But look, we
know sets contain objects in ordered rows.
Why don't we just collect every set and cre-
ate the set of all sets? Call it Q."
Aristotle:
Can you do that?
Nicholas:
[Smiling niischicvoiislyj Come on, think!
Don't you remember the principles of ordinal
generation Cantor laid out earlier?
Augustine:
I remember! Ev-
ery ordinal ii has a
successor ii*; every
well-ordered set is as-
sociated with an ordi-
nal number
—
Nicholas:
Yes ! In other words, no container can con-
tain all possible containers, including itself.
Cantor:
Well done, Nicholas. You've just uncov-
ered the paradox of the largest ordinal. "'^^
Augustine:
What's the solution?
Cantor:
The problem comes from misunderstand-
ing the definition of set. A set is an ordered
row of objects, not a group that meets a con-
dition for inclusion such as "the set of all sets."
You four just deduced that there is no largest
ordinal, and that the collection of all sets isn't
a set.'"
Aristotle:
So Q doesn't actually exist. It doesn't
even potentially exist.
Cantor:
Q exists, but the totality of all containers
cannot itself be a container—think about it.
Look, "the collection of all possible thoughts"
is an unthinkable thought, because if you
imagine the totality of all thoughts, the idea
of thinking all possible thoughts becomes a
thought not contained in your original collec-
Aquinas:
That means Q
must correspond to
the largest possible or-
dinal. But if there is an ordinal number for Q,
a successor ordinal Q.*—and therefore a set
larger than Q—must also exist.
Aristotle:
But by definition Q contains all sets, so
the set Q* must be contained in Q. Impos-
sible!
An ontological gap exists between the
finite and transfinite sets described by set
theory and Q—a gap that we cannot
bridge without something beyond math-
ematics to help us. r A ' 1[Augustine]
tion.^" This doesn't mean the sum of all pos-
sible thoughts doesn't exist, just that the sum
cannot be a thought. Analogously. Q. exists,
but it is not a set: We cannot say anything
definite about Q using set theory. It repre-
sents absolute infinity, which transcends set
theory and can only come from God.-'
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Augustine:
Yes, you must go beyond mathematics to
understand Q. We've used set theory to reach
ever larger transt'inite numbers, but set theory
itself points us towards the absolute infinite.
We can try to use set theory as an instructive
analogy for Q, but an ontological gap exists
between the finite and transfinite sets de-
scribed by set theory and Q—a gap that we
cannot bridge without something beyond
mathematics to help us.
Nicholas:
I'd go even further than that. Like divine
infinity, Q represents a paradox that highlights
our inability to understand the one true and
complete infinity."
Cantor:
Nicholas, you are eerily perceptive. I've
finished my presentation on set theory sooner
than I expected, so we've got some more time
for discussion.
Aquinas:
I think set theory has some interesting
theological implications. Have you ever con-
sidered doing any systematic work in that di-
rection?
Cantor:
As a matter of fact, I've thought quite a
lot about the theological implications of my
theory. Most people don't know this, because
during my lifetime set theory was very con-
troversial, and I was forced to downplay the
theological implications of my theory in most
publications." It was God who revealed the
transfinite numbers to me and who gave me
the faith and strength to defend set theory
against the criticism it received.'"* I think He
did this so that I might give His church the
first true philosophy of the infinite''^ and rec-
oncile the word of God with true philosophy
and science, according to Pope Leo XIII's
1879 encyclical, Aeterni Patris!'^ To this end
I corresponded with a number of high-rank-
ing Catholic Priests such as Constantin
Gutberlet, who used set theory to support his
ideas about the reality of actual infmity. Other
priests interested in set theory included
Ignatius Jeiler, a group of Jesuits led by Tho-
mas Esser, and even Cardinal Johannes
Franzelin.''^ The cardinal condemned my
work as pantheistic, but after I explained the
difference between transfinite and absolute
infinity, he agreed that transfinite infinities
represent actual infinities that are less than
God's perfect, divine infinity.''** I even ad-
dressed a few documents directly to Pope Leo
XIII himself.'''^ I'm not Roman Catholic, but
I was glad to help the Church understand the
reality of actual infinity.
Aristotle:
Cantor, you may be right. I still hold that
natural numbers are potentially infinite, be-
cause you can never get through them by
counting—they have no end. But the num-
ber of all natural numbers can be realized; we
just have to get beyond notions of counting
to see it. Infinite sets actually have a well-
defined size denoted by their ciirdinality. Your
example of the line is instructive here: A fi-
nite line segment comprises an infinite num-
ber of points, which are uncountable because
they're infinitely more numerous than the very
numbers we use for counting! Still, we do
know how many points are on the line, be-
cause we know the line is a set with cardinal-
ity 2**". Potentials, even potential infinities,
can be actualized if you use the right method.
For example, we know humans can't swim
across the Mediterranean. Yet on the other
hand, we know people can potentially build
ships and can, therefore, actually cross the
sea.^" But I'm still puzzled about Q.
Cantor:
Transfinite numbers are definitely simpler
than Q. Some transfinite numbers are even
more accessible than some natural ones. Isn't
the number i^
^
easier to comprehend than, say,
12"'' '**"
-I- 7 ? This number clearly exists, but
it has no practical value—ideas like an and
i^i are more important philosophically, theo-
logically, and practically.'''
Nicholas:
Well, at least we all agree about the
transfinites. I'm glad you resolved the po-
tential-actual piuadox, but the resolution just
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proves my point that neither concept is useful
for talking about God.
Aquinas:
Maybe not, but Aristotle's distinction also
helps us understand the idea of limits. Infi-
nite sets are unlimited with respect to their
potential, because they can't be counted. Still,
sets represent types of containers, and any-
thing we can put into a container must be
bounded. Cantor has shown that sets—even
infinite ones—are limited by their cardinal-
ity. Let's go back to the line example. Every
line segment has endpoints and a finite length,
but it still contains 2**" points.^- The line is
finite in one aspect, and infinite in another.
As for absolute infinity, it is infinite in every
aspect. ^^ We know Q, can't be put into a con-
tainer, so it's unlimited in a way that
transfinites aren't. I might say that Q only
exists in potential if I weren't so sure that the
collection of all sets is real. After all, it's hard
to see how a collection of things can be less
real than the things collected.
Nicholas:
Thomas, you've just explained away one
more paradox—transfinite numbers are both
unlimited and contained. But as the paradox
disappears, so does our hope of understand-
ing God through the language of set theory.
Aristotle:
Are you sure Q is real?
Augustine:
Of course! Earlier I talked about the on-
tological gap between the finhe and the infi-
nite, but now that we know about different
kinds of infinity, we can see that the gap actu-
ally sepaiates the transfinite and the absolute
infinite. The transfinite sequence of ordinal
containers suggests absolute infinity, but Q
transcends set theory and all transfinite num-
bers. You can't count it and you can't ma-
nipulate it, even with transfinite arithmetic.
The hierarchical relationship among the finite,
the transfinite, and the absolute infinite can,
however, help us understand our relationship
to God. Observations suggest we are both
part of and different from the rest of God's
creation. Perhaps our relation to God's cre-
ation is analogous to the transfinite 's relation
to the finite. Didn't Aristotle's analogy show
that humans have both potential and actual
abilities? And that our minds and bodies are
limited in some ways, but have limitless po-
tential in others? Our minds are illumined by
sparks of God's divinity that direct our
thoughts towards God.^^ But we'll never over-
come the fundamental divide—the ontologi-
cal gap—between us and God. You can ex-
tend this analogy to look at God's relation-
ship to the world. Q contains all sets, but is
not itself contained. The language of set
theory points to Q. but finally cannot describe
it, because it's ontologically different from
everything we can describe in mathematical
or set theoretical terms. Similarly, God is
imminently present in the world since the
whole world is encompassed by God. At the
same time, God is different from physical re-
ality and transcends all attempts at descrip-
tion in ordinary language.
Aristotle:
Are you saying Q. is equivalent to God?^''
Augustine:
No, but some kind of relation exists be-
tween Q and the divine, because the abstract
notion of number conies to us by what can
only be called divine inspiration.^'^' Even if
we were given the ability to understand Q,
we still couldn't comprehend God, of whom
Q is an incomplete, imperfect reflection. I've
always believed in analogy. Nicholas might
not, but if Cantor hadn't used finite numbers
as an analogy for understanding the infinite,
we'd still be in the dark about absolute in-
finity.
Nicholas:
[Triumphantly] Fair enough, Augustine,
but this is really the end—I've finally found
a paradox I can sink my teeth into. We un-
derstand—we know—Q is real, but we've also
proven it can't be a set, so we can't under-
stand Q in set theoretic terms. Going beyond
set theory will always mean using imperfect
analogies, guesswork, and faith. Humans can
never lift the veil that shrouds God in unknow-
able majesty. Navigating tlirough all these
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paradoxes only reveals the strangest paradox
of all. We've convinced ourselves we can
know something about the unknowable by
using language to talk about ideas that we
admit defy description! Within this paradox,
this mystery, we finally have some hope of
encountering God.
Cantor:
Well, I think we've gone through all of
infinity. I hope you enjoyed this class as much
as I did. Be sure to stop by next week for
Robinson's lecture on non-standard analysis!
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